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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooooOoooo
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public entity,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an individual
d/b/a the Pawn Shop, a Utah
corporation; and TERRY
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a
Jewelers & Loans,

Case No. 880302-CA

Defendants and Appellants,
and
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a public entity,

Case No. 880292-CA

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D.
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE
BARROWS, ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an
individual d/b/a The Pawn Shop;
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah corporation
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual
d/b/a Jim's Ribs; TERRY
PANTELAKIS, an individual d/b/a
Jewelers & Loans and Sales, Inc.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Defendants and Appellants Burge, Barrows and Barrows, by
and through their attorney of record, John T. Evans, hereby
petition the Court for a rehearing in connection with the Opinion
of the Court in the above-entitled matters filed on October 11,
1989, as to issues I and III set forth in such Opinion, as follows:
POINT I
THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
IN THE STIPULATION AND THE MATERIALITY OF
POSSESSION IN DETERMINING WHETHER INTEREST
SHOULD BE PAID.
In the discussion beginning on page 8 of the Court's Opinion
as to the issue of the payment of interest on funds deposited with
the Court, the Court concludes that the owners should receive no
interest because the RDA did not receive possession.

In other

words, the taking of actual possession was the consideration for
the payment of interest.
In

arriving

at

its

conclusion, the

Court

compares

the

stipulation with Utah Code Anno. Section 78-34-9 (1987) (herein
"Section 9") and seems to conclude that since their purpose and
requirements closely parallel each other, the parties must have
intended that the stipulation be interpreted in accordance with the
provisions of Section 9.

The Court seems to reason that Section

9 does not provide for interest to accrue until possession is
transferred, therefore the parties must have intended that their
stipulation so provide.
The Court, however, should not overlook the fact that (1) the
terms of the stipulation show no relationship between payment of
interest

and

possession;

and

(2)

even

if

possession

was

consideration for the payment of interest, interest should be paid
because possession was not material.
1.

This Court agrees that "the document at issue is an

agreement, stipulated to by the parties.M

(Opinion at page 8.)

Inasmuch as we are interpreting an agreement entered into between
the parties, the Court should look at the actual provisions of the
stipulation to determine the intent of the parties.
The terms of the stipulation contemplate the payment of
interest without transferring possession. Although the intent of
the stipulation is to accomplish the same purpose as that of a
Section 9 order, i.e., to establish the terms for obtaining
possession, the issue before this Court, however, is to harmonize
the terms within the stipulation, not to determine what are the
terms of Section 9.

If anything is obvious from the agreement, it

is that the parties intended to deviate from the provisions of
Section 9.
appraised

The stipulation requires a 100% deposit of the
value

instead

of

75% required

by

Section

9,

the

stipulation requires the owners to give up their right to contest
RDA's power of condemnation if the ADL is signed with Lincoln, not
just when funds are withdrawn as provided in Section 9, and the
stipulation provides for interest to run at a rate of 11 1/2%
instead of the 8% provided for in Section 9.
That the payment of interest was consideration for the right
to receive possession and not actual possession, is evident from
other important provisions in the stipulation overlooked in the
Opinion that deviate from 78-34-9, as follows:
2

(a)

In the first place, the stipulation is silent as to

a consideration that would pass to the owners for their promise to
give up possession.

If the payment of interest was consideration

for actual possession, what was the consideration for the owners'
promise to give up their defenses to plaintiffs right to take?

It

is obvious that the owners gave up their legal defenses by giving
the plaintiff the right to take possession when entering into the
ADL.

The right to assert these defenses were valuable rights which

the owners gave up by their promise, and it was that promise that
was all the RDA really wanted or needed.
that the stipulation is a contract.

The opinion acknowledges

It does not matter whether the

label put upon the terms is that of "option" or something else.
The fact is that the owners1 promise to abandon their defenses is
a valuable consideration going to the RDA even absent any actual
transfer of possession.

No other consideration for such promise

is provided in the stipulation other than the payment of interest,
and the Opinion overlooks what consideration passed for the owners'
promise.

If the payment of interest was not the consideration,

then the RDA got everything it wanted (assurance given to Lincoln
of its power to condemn) and gave up nothing to get that assurance.
(b)

The

payment

of

interest

under

the

stipulation

accrues only against those funds being held on deposit with the
Clerk, whereas under Section 9, no interest is paid on the funds
on deposit.

The Court's Opinion does not address the fact that a

ruling that the payment of interest is consideration only for
actual

possession,

creates

a contradiction.
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This

is because

without the ADL being signed, actual possession could only be
transferred by the act of withdrawing funds from the Clerk.

The

very funds being withdrawn are the funds on which interest is to
be running.

The incongruity is obvious.

To earn interest, the

funds must be withdrawn, but any funds withdrawn will not earn
interest.

It is analogous to a bank stating that I will pay you

a higher rate of interest on money on your savings account so long
as you do not keep any funds in that account.

To interpret the

stipulation as stating that the RDA promised to pay interest on the
funds on deposit only if those funds are withdrawn, is an illusory
promise.

The fact that interest is to be paid only on such funds

on deposit points out that the extent of the stipulation was for
the RDA to provide for interest payments without receiving actual
possession,,
(c)

Section 9 interest begins accruing from the time

actual possession is transferred which time shall be fixed by the
Court.

The stipulation provides, however, that interest shall

begin running before the RDA takes possession and no time is fixed
for the transfer of possession even though interest is still
accruing.

This shows there is no relationship between the time

interest is to begin running and the time possession is to be
received.

Section 1(a) of the Stipulation provides that interest

shall accrue from August 16, 1985, when the promise (option) was
entered

into and the funds were deposited, not on the date

possession was to be transferred. It was never contemplated by the
parties that actual possession shall commence on August 16, 1985.
4

(d)

The stipulation also provides that the interest held

by the Clerk can be withdrawn without waiving the owners1 defenses
to the taking.

Withdrawal under Section 78-34-9, however, would

constitute an abandonment of the owners• right to contest RDA power
to obtain possession.

Under the stipulation, possession will be

transferred only when the deposit of $275,220.00 is withdrawn, not
when they withdrawn the interest earned thereon. Referring to the
deposited amount of $275,220.00, paragraph 1(a) states:

"The

withdrawal of all or any part of said deposited funds by . . .
(owners) shall constitute a waiver of any and all defenses to the
taking. . . . "

(Emphasis added.)

Paragraph 1(e) likewise states

that the plaintiff may not begin "collecting rent . . . " until the
owners "have . . . withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00
deposited with the clerk. . . . "
These provisions are not addressed by the Court in its
Opinion.

Had possession been a condition for receiving interest

payments, the contract would have provided for the transfer of
possession upon the withdrawal of interest.
2.

Interest should at least be awarded after off-setting

rents received.

The RDA did not need nor want actual possession.

The project proposed by Lincoln was still in its preliminary stages
and no design or projected use for the property had yet been
finalized.

Construction was months or years away as it effected

the subject property.
All

that the RDA

needed

or wanted

was to be

able to

demonstrate to the satisfaction of Lincoln that the RDA had the
5

right to obtain possession when needed.

The only thing that the

RDA needed was the owners1 promise to give possession, which
promise (option) was received when the stipulation was entered
into.

At that moment, the RDA received the benefit for which

consideration had to pass to the owners in the form of the promised
interest.
Therefore, if the Court remains of the opinion that actual
possession was a condition to the payment of interest, then it
should rule that possession was a condition not material to the
RDA.

Even though possession did not take place, such non-

occurrence of possession should not relieve the RDA of its duty to
pay

interest

in

full

as

required

under

the

terms

of

the

stipulation, less the cost of what was not performed, which in this
case, would be an offset for the benefit to the plaintiff of the
net rent the RDA should have received had possession been given.
(6 Corbin on Contract Section 1370 (1962)).
The RDA has agreed to pay this difference as set forth on page
10 of its Brief stating:

"The RDA is willing either to have the

order nun pro tunc effective and pay the interest agreed to, but
with the attendant right to receive possession of and income from
the property."

This would alleviate any injustice to the owners,

who were led to believe that interest continued to accrue to their
benefit without the need to give up possession of the property, and
who

were

prevented

from withdrawing

the

funds

as hereafter

discussed.
The

owners

were

unable

to
6

transfer

possession

by

the

withdrawal of funds.

On page 12 of the Court's Opinion, it notes

that the "owners during the approximately

85 days the funds

deposited with the Court remained unfrozen, never withdrew any of
the funds." It should be remembered that the owners were not able
to withdraw those funds because within one week of the entry of
the stipulation, the tenants filed their Answer and Objection to
the stipulation claiming the right to the whole thereof. Tenants'
Objection to Order filed on August 23, 1985, asserted a right under
the lease agreement to share in the proceeds to be awarded.
Although the actual "freeze" was not ordered until November 1,
1985, it would not have been appropriate for the owners to withdraw
those funds on deposit, given the tenants' claim thereto.
3.

The agreement satisfies the requirements of an option.

On page 12 of the Court's Opinion, it defines an option contract
as a "promise which meets the requirements for the formation of a
contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer."
is not

clear whether

the

Opinion misapprehends

whether

It
the

stipulation does not comply with the requirements of an option.
Certainly it is not mutually exclusive to have a stipulation that
can also incorporate option terms.

There is no question but what

we have a stipulation that complies with the requirements for the
formation of a contract.

There is also no question that the

stipulation by its terms limits the power of the owners to revoke
or back out of their promise to grant possession and give up any
and all defenses against the RDA's right to condemn if Lincoln and
RDA enter into their ADL.

In entering into the stipulation, the
7

owners gave the RDA an exclusive right to acquire the property
which the owners could not thereafter revoke. The requirements of
an option are complied with.
If the Court is stating its opinion that the agreement does
not meet the definition of an option, this should be clarified.
In conclusion, rehearing should be granted to allow this Court
to give full consideration to the contract provisions which show
that no relationship exists between the payment of interest and the
awarding

of

actual

possession, but

if

this

Court

concludes

otherwise, it should determine that actual possession was not a
material condition and that interest should be awarded after
allowing an offset for rents received, which amount should be
determined by the trial court upon remand.
POINT II
IN DETERMINING WHAT COSTS MAY BE AWARDED, THE
COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE MEANING OF THE ACTUAL
WORDING OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 11-1923.9 (1986).
In the Court's discussion of issue III, beginning on page 16
of the Opinion, it concludes that since Section 11-19-23.9 does not
expressly provide for compensation for expert witnesses, "costs"
should be defined as meaning taxable court costs as provided by
Rule

54(d)(1).

The

interpretation would be

Court

overlooks

the

fact

that

such

(1) inconsistent with the meaning of

"costs" as used elsewhere in the same Section, (2) not give meaning
to the word "including" as provided in the Section, (3) not be
consistent with the fact that under this section the award of costs

8

is discretionary with the court.
1.

The Court has failed to address the fact that the word

"costs" is used twice in Section 11-19-23.9.

The statute also

authorizes an award for "costs and expenses, if any, of relocating
the

owner."

Unless

the

legislature

intended

two

separate

definitions of the same word used in the same act, the legislature
did not intend that "costs," be limited to the narrow definition
of taxable court costs.

The term should be given a consistent

interpretation unless the legislature indicates otherwise. To give
harmony to the meaning of "costs" as used in both sentences in the
section, it should appear that the legislature intended "costs" in
the sense of reimbursement to the owner for expenses necessarily
incurred.

It

is not

enough

to say

that

just because the

legislature did not define costs, it must have meant "taxable court
costs."

"Costs" should be interpreted so as to harmonize with the

use of the term throughout the statute.
2.

The Opinion fails to attach any meaning to use of the

work "included."

On page 20 of its Opinion, the Court states that

"Section 11-19-23.9 authorizes compensation for costs and attorneys
fees.

.

.

."

(Emphasis

added.)

This

is a

very

critical

misstatement of what is authorized by that Section. The Court has
in fact interpreted that Section as though it did authorize costs
"and" attorneys fees, but in fact, the Section authorizes "costs,
including a reasonable attorneys fee." (Emphasis added.)
of the word "including" is not synonymous with "and."

The use

The Court

fails to address that distinction, but simply interprets the
9

provision as though "including" were nowhere to be found in the
statute, nor does the Court give any reason as to why it feels that
"including" should have the same meaning as the word "and."
"Including" denotes that attorneys fees are a part of the
meaning of the term "costs," hence extending the definition and the
meaning of costs beyond the narrow definition of taxable court
costs.
3.

The

legislature

would

not

have

made

the

statute

permissive if it intended that "costs" meant taxable court costs.
The Court correctly points out on page 19 of the Opinion that
Section 11-19-23.9 is permissive and discretionary with the Court,
i.e., the Court "may" award costs. This is further indication that
the legislature did not intend the costs to be limited to taxable
court costs under Rule 54(d)(1), inasmuch as such taxable costs are
not discretionary with the Court.

The legislature must have

intended that such costs being so authorized were those types of
costs that were discretionary costs and not the mandatory court
costs. The Court seems to have overlooked this inconsistent result
in its Opinion and this should be addressed by the Court to make
a full and complete determination of the meaning of the statute.
The Opinion, as presently rendered by the Court, does not
address either the meaning of "including" as set forth in the
statute, nor does it attempt to give harmony to the term "costs"
as used elsewhere in the statute nor does it explain the effect of
making the awarding of Rule 54(d)(1) costs discretionary.

The

literal meaning of those provisions and terms should be given
10

effect and not overlooked by the Court. The owners are not arguing
that the constitution so requires, but simply that the legislature
has so intended.
I certify that the foregoing petition is in good faith and not
for delay.
Dated this 24th day of October, 1989.
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING

John T. Evans
Attorneys for Defendants/
Appellants
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